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ABSTRACT
IZA DP No. 13567 AUGUST 2020
Can Stimulus Checks Boost an Economy 
under COVID-19?  
Evidence from South Korea*
Various countries have implemented transfer programs to individuals since the Covid-19 
outbreaks. However, the extent to which such transfers alleviate economic recessions is 
unclear. This paper analyzes a South Korean program, which provided vouchers redeemable 
only at small local businesses. We find that, due to the program, over 30% of households 
across all income groups increased their food and overall household spending, but the 
usage restriction may have affected consumer choice, distorting business competition. 
While the employment and sales of small businesses improved, the program’s fiscal 
sustainability is in question because of the large tax exemption.
JEL Classification: H2, H6, D3, D6, L1









* We thank Ben Malin, Felix Reichling, and Seokjin Woo for their helpful comments. This paper was developed 
based on, but is substantially different from, the KIPF’s policy brief titled “Unconditional Cash Transfers to Youth in 
South Korea.” The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Korea Institute of 
Public Finance or the Seoul National University. All errors are our own.
	 2 
I. Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic has been gravely affecting economies around the world, leading to soaring 
unemployment in many countries. As a tool to promptly relieve economic distress, there have been 
demands for direct transfers to individuals or households (IMF 2020). Countries adopting such a 
scheme include Hong Kong, Japan, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States (OECD, 
2020, IMF 2020).  Although such transfers certainly benefit households, it is unclear to what extent 
they affect household consumption and, consequently, support businesses. For example, consumption 
responses crucially depend on marginal propensities to consume (Baker et al., 2020). Furthermore, the 
Covid-19 transfer programs may have different effects on employment and businesses relative to the 
transfer programs used in other recession periods because, to avoid infection, people may not consume 
as much and may change their consumption behaviors as well (see Chetty et al., 2020, for a US study). 
 This paper conducts empirical analyses to gauge the effect of Covid-19 transfers using the 
South Korean case. In May 2020, the Korean government introduced a one-time universal transfer 
scheme whose stated goal was to promote consumption and help small businesses as well as their 
employees. The government distributed vouchers to all households, redeemable only at small-sized 
establishments located in their neighborhoods until August 2020. The voucher amount depended on 
the number of household members and their residence. On average, a three-person household received 
vouchers worth US$799 (1.7% of the annual household income in 2019).  
Instead of waiting for standard labor and household data to become available, we use two 
complementary methods to preliminarily assess the effects of consumption vouchers. First, we use a 
survey of 2,000 households to assess whether the transfer scheme actually increased consumption, one 
of the policy goals. The survey inquires about the amount of vouchers households received, their usage, 
and changes in household consumption and savings. Survey responses show that, thanks to the 
consumption vouchers, over one-third of households increased their food and household spending and 
a quarter of households increased their total spending. The share of households increasing consumption 
and total spending is comparable across all income groups. Those increases in consumption and total 
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spending were not large enough to decrease savings for most households (89%). The majority of the 
households reported difficulty using all the vouchers at local small-scale businesses.  We interpret this 
response as evidence suggesting that the usage restriction may distort consumer choice, weakening 
online-based or large-scale stores relative to small offline businesses. Finally, we acknowledge that 
these survey responses may not accurately reflect causal effects of the voucher program and that the 
limited information from the survey prohibits us from evaluating the policy effects on businesses and 
their employees, another policy goal. We address these limitations using a second method.  
Our second method is to infer the policy effects on businesses by examining a precedent local 
policy that serves as a prototype of the Covid-19 voucher scheme. The Covid-19 scheme adopted key 
features of the local policy introduced by the Seongnam municipal government in 2016, and expanded 
the coverage to all citizens. In fact, the two policies are comparable in terms of the amount of transfers 
per eligible household and the limited use of vouchers to small-sized local businesses. Using a 
differences in differences (DID) method, we find that the 2016 policy was effective in increasing the 
number of employees of businesses hiring fewer than 5 full-time workers (on average 2.9% in 2016 
and 2017). Its impact on sales is positive (5%) but not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
If our findings are applicable to the Covid-19 transfer program, then the program may support small 
businesses by maintaining their employees and sales. However, these effects are not likely to generate 
tax revenues because a large share of workers and small businesses are granted tax exemptions or are 
subject to lower tax rates.  
In summary, our findings point out the possibility that the Covid-19 transfer program in South 
Korea may be effective in increasing consumption and helping small businesses retain their workers, 
but its fiscal burden and possible distortionary effects call for further examination of how to design 





II. Institutional Background 
II.1 Overview of the Covid-19 Outbreak and Policy Responses 
In South Korea, the first Covid-19 case was confirmed on January 20, 2020. One month later, rapid 
increases in the number of cases followed (Park et al., 2020). See Figure 1 in the Online Appendix. 
The South Korean government promptly responded to the Covid-19 pandemic by establishing a Covid-
19 rapid response team, tracking down patients and those with whom they were in contact, and 
disinfecting the places the patients visited (KCDC, 2020). Although South Korea has never imposed a 
large-scale lockdown, concern over a Covid-19-induced economic recession made the central 
government and bank introduce various stimulus packages starting on February 5, 2020. The packages 
consist of typical fiscal and monetary policies against recessions, such as lowering interest rates, 
providing credit lines to businesses, and increasing government expenditures (MOEF, 2020).  
The Korean government decided to provide one-time universal transfers to households in order 
to boost consumption and to support small-sized businesses and their employees, which were 
especially vulnerable to a sales decline induced by Covid-19. Such transfers to all citizens are 
unprecedented in South Korea, so they provoked serious political debates and opposition until their 
approval on April 30,2020. The only existing policy close to the universal transfers is the 2016 local 
policy adopted by the municipal government of Seongnam. In fact, the Covid-19 transfer scheme is 
modelled after the 2016 local policy, and the two policies share many similarities, as discussed below.  
II.2 Consumption Voucher Schemes in 2016 and 2020 
Political Landscape 
The South Korean government consists of three layers. Municipal governments, a total of 226, are the 
smallest unit of government that has discretion over tax revenues and budgets, within the boundaries 
set by their supervising authorities, namely regional governments, and ultimately by the central 
government. See Section 1 of the Online Appendix. South Korea has a relatively short history of 
regional autonomy, and the regional and municipal governments heavily rely on transfers from the 
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central government.1 For this reason, municipal and regional governments generally follow the policy 
guidelines set by the central government.  
 In the mid-2000s, the possibility of adopting universal transfers had been discussed as a tool 
to address poverty among the elderly, and again, ten years later, to help young adults escape joblessness. 
However, the Korean central government had been reluctant to accept such an idea, and no regional 
or municipal government had gone against the central government’s stance. A very notable and highly 
controversial exception is the municipal government of Seongam, home to 1 million residents, ranked 
12th largest city in Korea in terms of population size and 10th in terms of local tax revenues in 2019. In 
September 2015, the mayor of Seongnam signed a bill to provide an unconditional transfer each quarter, 
worth US$ 207 each, to 24-year-old residents, starting from 2016. The bill was founded upon the idea 
of a universal basic income but restricted to those age 24, due to fiscal capacity constraints.2 Although 
the transfer was given to 24-year-olds, its economic effect may be comparable to a transfer to a 
household with one 24-year-old because in Seongnam, and also in Korea overall, almost all 24-year 
old adults live with and rely on their parents for a living, without full-time jobs. According to a survey 
of over 495 individuals aged 24 who received the Seongnam voucher in 2016, 92% lived with their 
parents, and they used the vouchers on food and household spending (66%) or gave the vouchers to 
family members (20%) (IGT, 2016). 
 The political environment in Korea explains why the 2020 consumption voucher scheme was 
designed after, and thus is comparable to, the Seongnam 2016 policy. As the Covid-19 pandemic 
started to spread around the world and its negative impact on the global economy became prolonged, 
political calls for income support to households, such as the 2016 Seongnam scheme, arose in South 
 
1 In 1995, South Koreans started to elect the heads of regional and municipal governments. Since then, certain 
types of taxes have been converted from national taxes to regional or municipal taxes. However, national tax 
revenues are the dominant source of government finances. For example, in 2018, 78% of tax revenues was 
from national taxes while only 22% was from regional or municipal taxes. For details see 
http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/localSelf/process.do. The composition of national and regional taxes is 
available at http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1123.  
2 The central government rejected that bill in December 2015, but Seongnam nonetheless provided the vouchers 
as planned in 2016.  The central government took the case to court, but the lawsuit was eventually dropped when 
President Park Geun-hye was impeached in March 2017, and President Moon Jae-in, who belongs to the same 
political party as  Mr. Lee, became president.  
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Korea. Mr. Lee Jae-myung, the current governor of Gyeonggi Province and the former mayor of 
Seongnam who adopted the 2016 scheme, announced his plan to expand the Seongnam consumption 
voucher scheme to all residents of Gyeonggi on April 1, 2020 and started to distribute the vouchers on 
April 9. Gyeonggi Province, surrounding Seoul, is Korea’s most populated region, home to over a 
quarter of South Koreans, and it supervises 31 municipal governments, including Seongnam. While 
the central Korean government was initially reluctant to implement such policies because of their fiscal 
burden, it yielded and adopted a consumption voucher scheme that was effectively the same as the 
Gyeonggi plan; it started to distribute the vouchers on May 4.  
Consumption Vouchers 
Under the 2020 voucher scheme, all South Koreans are entitled to the consumption vouchers from the 
central government, while some may receive additional vouchers from their municipal and/or regional 
governments. For the former, the voucher transfers are given to the head of a household, and the 
amount depends on the number of household members. For a three-person household, the central 
government provides approximately US$664.3 Of the 22 million households in South Korea, 99.5% 
received consumption vouchers from the central government by June 7, 2020 (MOIS, 2020). In 
addition, 2 regional and 47 municipal governments provided vouchers to their residents, ranging from 
US$83 to US$332 per person.4 In total, a family of three, on average, received a total amount of 
vouchers worth US$799. Consumption vouchers cannot be cashed, expire on August 31, 2020, and 
can be used within the residential areas. Specifically, even if the central government provides the 
vouchers, a person can use them in the region he/she lives in (i.e., metropolitan or province). Vouchers 
provided by a regional or municipal government must be used within the municipal area of residence. 
 
3 We convert 1,000 Korean won into 0.83 US dollars based on the average exchange rate between January and 
May 2020. As the average number of household members is 2.57 persons in the 2015 population census, we 
choose a three-person household as an example to calculate the amount of the consumption vouchers.  
4 For example, residents of Seongnam are given vouchers by the central government, by the Gyeonnggi 
regional government (US$83 per person), and by the Seongnam government (US$83 per person), while the 
transfer from the central government is netted out by the Gyeonnggi regional government’s contribution (20% 
of the voucher). 
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Retail businesses that accept credit or check cards are eligible for the consumption vouchers. 
Exceptions include bars, clubs, online stores, and large-sized retail stores.5   
The Korean policy shares similarities with Japan’s 1999 shopping coupon program and 
Taiwan’s 2009 shopping voucher scheme. But different from the Korean program, only a quarter of 
Japanese households were eligible for the Japanese program, and the Taiwanese plan did not restrict 
usage to small-sized local businesses (see Kan et al., 2017, and Hsieh et al., 2010).  
 Key features of the 2020 voucher scheme are shared by the 2016  Seongnam scheme, such as 
eligibility without means testing and limitations on usage to small businesses in one’s area of residence. 
The value of the vouchers per eligible household is comparable – for a three-person family, US$799 
in 2020 vs. US$828 in 2016.6 There are two notable differences. The total amount of the Covid-19 
vouchers is much higher compared to the 2016 Seongnam vouchers because of  universal eligibility. 
For example, in 2016 the Seongnam municipal government spent US$9 million for consumption 
vouchers, while the Covid-19 vouchers are worth US$11 billion, distributed across the entire country.  
The other difference is that the Covid-19 voucher scheme imposed a three-month expiration (August 
31, 2020), while the 2016 scheme did not impose such an immediate expiration date. Given the lack 
of data directly evaluating the Covid-19 scheme, we think empirical findings based on the 2016 policy 
can serve as an educated guess about the policy effects from the Covid-19 transfer scheme. For a 
detailed comparison of the two schemes, see Section 2 of the Online Appendix.  
III. The Effect of the Covid-19 Consumption Vouchers 
III.1 Evidence from Survey Results  
Data Source  
We were granted access to a survey conducted by the Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF) between 
June 26 and July 1, 2020. The survey includes 3,672 adults, but yields a sample of 2,000 valid 
 
5 These large-sized retail stores include department stores, Costco, E-mart (a Walmart-equivalent in South 
Korea), and other stores whose annual sales are over US$0.83 million.  
6 The value of the 2016 Seongnam transfer is US$862 in 2020 with inflation adjustment between 2016 and 
2020.  
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participants who are either the head of the household or the spouse.  The survey sample is highly 
comparable to the overall Korean population except for an over-representation of college graduates. 
See details in Section 3 of the Online Appendix. 
Consumption Vouchers and Usages  
The survey participants received consumption vouchers worth on average US$873 ($629 from the 
central government and $244 from the regional or municipal government), and 86% of participants 
had already spent over 70% of their vouchers by the time they participated in the survey. The survey 
asks participants whether they increased, decreased, or maintained their consumption spending, total 
spending, and savings since the Covid-19 outbreak started. All except for 49 participants answered the 
questions. Compared to their spending prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, 36% of respondents increased 
their consumption spending, and 26% increased their total spending including both consumption and 
non-consumption spending. The gap between these two types of spending suggests a reduction in non-
consumption spending, which is also documented in the recent report by the Korean Statistics Bureau 
(SK, 2020). If, holding income constant, the increase in total spending exceeds the value of vouchers 
a household received, then household savings will decrease. In our survey, such a case is reported by 
11% of participants. These findings suggest that the voucher scheme successfully increased 
consumption spending among 36% of the households, and total spending to a lesser extent (29%), but 
the magnitude of the spending increase did not exceed the value of the transfers, leading to only 11% 
of households having a smaller amount of savings. Our findings remain qualitatively the same if we 
focus only on the 78% of the households whose income remained comparable before and after the 
pandemic started.  
As for the use of vouchers, 82% of people used vouchers to purchase necessities that they 
regularly consume. In fact, the most frequent places they used vouchers are groceries (46%), followed 
by restaurants (24%), then pharmacies and hospitals (12%). In line with our findings, those three 
consumption categories account for 59% of voucher spending between May 9 and May 31, 2020 
(MOIS, 2020b). In the US, upon receiving a 2020 stimulus check, households significantly increased 
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spending on food, household goods and personal care (Baker et al., 2020). This pattern echoes what 
we find in South Korea. 
 Next, we examine the relationship between income and propensity to consume more with the 
vouchers. We divide households into 6 groups based on current monthly income and plot the changes 
in household expenditures after the voucher scheme was introduced (Panels A to C of Figure 1). Group 
1 refers to the lowest income group, while Group 6 refers to the highest.7 We find no strong evidence 
suggesting that propensity to increase spending due to vouchers is larger among low income earners. 
See the Online Appendix (Section 3, Table 3.4) for details of the statistical tests.  
 Finally, the survey participants were asked if they had any difficulty using the vouchers. The 
majority of participants expressed their wish to spend the vouchers at online and large-scale stores 
(45%), or stores located in other regions (10%), while 43% reported no complaints about the usage 
restrictions. We regard these wishes as suggestive evidence of possible distortionary effects of voucher 
schemes in terms of the size and location of the establishments. Although the number of large-scale 
establishments (100 or more fulltime workers) is small (1.3%) in Korea, they account for about 50% 
of employment and exhibit higher compensation and productivity than small-scale ones. Thus, a 
distortionary policy promoting small-scale establishments in place of large-scale ones could harm 
overall productivity and labor income in the long run.  
III.2 Evidence from the 2016 Consumption Voucher Scheme 
Data and Sample  
We use two types of limited-access administrative datasets, provided by the National Employment 
Insurance (NEI) and the National Tax Bureau (NTB). The NEI uses the information on workers who 
register for national employment insurance, covering 50% of those who had a job in 2019.8 Then, the 
 
7 We divide households into 6 groups based on their monthly income: up to 199 million won (US$ 1,654, 
Group 1), 200 to 299 million won (Group 2), 300 to 399 million won (Group 3), 400 to 499 million won 
(Group 4), 500 to 699 million won (Group 5), and equal to or more than 700 million won (Group 6).  
8 Temporary employees and self-employed individuals can sign up for national employment insurance, while 
wage earners are required to sign up. As of August 2019, the share of those who signed up for the NEI was 
50.36% among all workers and 67.02% among all workers excluding the self-employed.  
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NEI compiles a database including the monthly information on establishments, their locations, 
industries, and the number of employees.9 Using the tax files for value-added taxes (VAT), the NTB 
selects a 10% random sample of establishments, and constructs a yearly dataset of establishments, their 
locations and the amount of sales, but not the number of employees. Note that tax filing is mandatory 
for all establishments with taxable sales, which included 88% of establishments in Korea during our 
sample period. We use the NEI data to estimate the impact on employment, while the NTB data is 
used to measure the effect on firm’s performance, measured by sales. 
 Over the period from 2015 to 2017, we analyze the information on small establishments that 
hired fewer than 100 full-time workers for the NEI, and that are sole proprietorships, instead of 
corporations, for the NTB. We exclude large-scale businesses, which account for 1.3% of the 
establishments and 49.2% of employment, because rather than targeting local consumers, they may 
address clients across South Korea and internationally.  The unit of observation is the district by time 
(defined by month and year for NEI and year for NTB). For each observation, we have the number of 
employees and total sales of small establishments. Finally, we narrow down our sample to 20 districts 
(18 municipalities) – 3 districts in Seongnam and 17 districts that are comparable to the 3 Seongnam 
districts with respect to the demographic characteristics of their residents.10 This restriction helps us 
estimate the causal effect of the 2016 policy using the Differences in Differences (DID) strategy.  
Econometric Framework and Identification Strategy  
We conduct a DID estimation to measure the causal effects of the 2016 voucher program on economic 
outcomes: 
 
9 There are other datasets we could have used to examine employment but decided not to use. For example, we 
do not use the monthly survey of labor supply, conducted by the National Statistics Bureau, because it does not 
provide information on the work place (e.g., location and type). All other surveys of establishments collected by 
the Ministry of Labor are yearly or half-yearly, which dramatically reduces the sample size, and masks the effect 
of the treatment.  
10 We combine the 2015 census and the 2015 NEI dataset to construct the district-level data. The dataset 
contains for each district information on number of residents, age composition of residents (5 groups: 19 or 
less, 20-39, 40-59, 60-69, 70 or more), share of women, share of those who are working (i.e., workers), the age 
(5 groups), education, occupation, and industry of the workers. We then estimate an OLS model by regressing 
the treatment status on the district-level characteristics and selecting the top 20 districts, including the three 
districts of Seongnam, from the highest predicted probability. Details are in the Online Appendix (Section 4). 
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!!,#,$ = # ∙ %(' ∈ )*+,-; - ∈ /01-) + 4! + 5$ + 6!,#,$ (1) 
where	!!,#,$ is an outcome variable of district d, municipal m, and time t. Variable %(' ∈ )*+,-; - ∈
/01-)	is one if residents in district d are eligible for consumption vouchers at the time t, and zero 
otherwise. Parameters 4! 	and	5$ capture district- and time-fixed effects. Variable 	6!,#,$	captures 
unexplained random shock, clustered at the municipal level, as it is the unit of determining local taxes 
and consumption vouchers. Our identifying assumption is that, absent the 2016 voucher program, the 
trends in economic outcomes would have been the same in both the treatment and control groups.  
Using the monthly data of the NEI, we conduct a falsification test to examine the plausibility 
of our assumption.  We restrict our sample to the pre-recession period (January to December 2015) 
and estimate equation (1) including the interaction effects between the treatment group and the dummy 
indicating the second half of 2015.  If the two groups share the same time trend, then the interaction 
effects should not be different from zero, which indeed we find.  Panel A, Column 1 of Table 2 reports 
the results. Note that we could not conduct the same test for sales, as the NTB data is yearly and we 
have only one pre-treatment period.  
Estimation Results  
Table 2 reports the results: Panel A for employment effects, Panel B for effects on sales, columns (2) 
to (5) for the immediate effect in 2016, and columns (6) to (9) for effects for two years (2016-2017). 
The estimated effects substantially vary by time span and type of establishment. However, two patterns 
are robust. First, due to the 2016 policy, establishments hiring fewer than 5 full-time workers, namely 
mom-and-pop stores, increased their employees by 2.8 in 2016 and 2.9 percent between 2016 and 2017, 
both statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, we do not have a strong evidence suggesting that 
the 2016 voucher scheme increased the amount of sales. Although the point estimates suggest a 5.9% 
and 5.0% increase in sales, the effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels. It is still 
possible that the voucher scheme may increase sales of establishments with fewer than 5 full-time 




Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we examine the economic importance of the estimated 
effects. The voucher program increased the employment by mom-and-pop stores by 2.8% in 2016. 
This increase implies 797 more individuals were employed, which is 0.16% relative to the total number 
of workers in Seongnam. This magnitude is sizable, considering the fact that from 2015 to 2016, the 
number of workers in Seongnam increased only by 0.8% (3,950 persons). Furthermore, applied to 
minimum wage rates with full-time jobs, that increased employment is worth US$10.0 million, 
exceeding the total spending by the Seongnam municipal government for the program (US$8.7 
million). The increased employment may not be able to generate more revenues from labor income 
taxes because many employees, including full-time workers with minimum wage rates, are exempt 
from taxes under the current tax system.11  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines South Korea’s universal transfer program aimed at alleviating a Covid-19-
induced recession. Using survey responses and analyzing a pilot program in 2016, we find that the 
transfer program may be effective in boosting household consumption and supporting small 
establishments and their employees. Our findings also suggest two concerns associated with the 
transfer program. First, by excluding online and large businesses, the program may constrain consumer 
choice and reallocate resources from large or online businesses to small and offline stores, possibly 
harming consumer welfare and economic efficiency in the long run. Second, the transfer program 
requires further analysis of its impact on fiscal balance and sustainability. In South Korea, the Covid-
19 universal transfer program cost the central government US$ 11 billion (0.7% of the 2019 GDP), 
with a quarter of the cost being financed by government debt. As the program is unlikely to generate 
additional tax revenues, further scrutiny is needed to examine its merit relative to existing policy 
instruments as well as its impact on fiscal sustainability.   
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Table 1. Covid-19 Consumption Voucher Scheme 
 
A. Central government: 1 out of 1 
     The amount of the transfer: 400,000 won for one-person households, 600,000 won  
     for two-person households, 800,000 won for three-person households, and 1,000,000 won for  
     households of four or more. 
B. Regional governments: 2 out of 17 
B.1 Metropolitan governments:  Gwangju(50) 
B.2 Provincial government: Gyeonggi(100) 
C. Municipal governments: 47 out of 226 
C.1 Busan: Gijang(100), Busanjin(50), Dong(50), Haeundae(50), Nam(50), Sasang(50),  
       Seo(50), Suyeong(50) 
C.2 Ulsan: Ulju(100) 
C.3 Gyeonggi: Pocheon(400), Ansung (250), Hwaseong(200), Yeoncheon(200),  
      Dongducheon (150), Icheon(150), Yangpyeong(120), Suwon(100), Seongnam(100),  
      Pyeongtaek(100), Ansan(100), Gwacheon(100), Osan(100), Siheung(100), Yongin(100), 
      Paju(100), Yangju(100), Yeoju(100), Gapyung(100), Guri(90), Uijeongbu(50), 
      Anyang(50), Pucheon(50), Gwangmyeong(50), Goyang(50), Gunpo(50), Uiwang(50), 
       Hanam(50), Gimpo(50), Gwangju(50)  
C.4 Gangwon: Hongcheon(300), Inje(200), Jeongseon(200), Yanggu(100), Cheorwon(100) 
C.5 Jeonbuk: Gunsan(100), Iksan(100) 
C.6 Jeonnam: Gwangyang(200) 
Note:  Numeric values in parentheses are the amount of consumption vouchers per person (unit of KRW1,000, 
or US$0.83). This table only includes the consumption voucher transfers without means testing. Thus, the 
subsidies to households in need are absent from this table. 
 
Figure 1. Household Finance and the Covid-19 Consumption Vouchers 
Panel A. Consumption Spending by Income Groups 
 
Note: We divide households into 6 groups based on their current monthly income: up to 199 million won 
(US$ 1,654, Group 1), 200 to 299 million won (Group 2), 300 to 399 million won (Group 3), 400 to 499 
million won (Group 4), 500 to 699 million won (Group 5), and equal to or more than 700 million won (Group 
6). “%Increase”, refers to the share of households that increased their corresponding outcome after the Covid-
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Figure 1. Household Finance and the Covid-19 Consumption Vouchers 
Panel B. Total Spending by Income Groups 
 
 
Panel C. Savings by Income Group 
 
Note: We divide households into 6 groups based on their current monthly income: up to 199 million won 
(US$ 1,654, Group 1), 200 to 299 million won (Group 2), 300 to 399 million won (Group 3), 400 to 499 
million won (Group 4), 500 to 699 million won (Group 5), and equal to or more than 700 million won (Group 
6). “%Increase”, refers to the share of households that increased their corresponding outcome after the Covid-
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